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Abstract 
 
Informed by the theory of constructed emotion, this thesis explored how people’s beliefs about their 
internal bodily or interoceptive signals might interact with and be mediated by alexithymia (difficulty 
identifying and understanding emotions) in predicting subjective and physiological changes during acute 
stress. Across two sessions, 250 healthy young adults completed measures of interoceptive beliefs and 
alexithymia and also underwent the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) to induce acute psychosocial stress. 
Participants’ cardiac reactivity was measured before, during, and after the TSST. Immediately after the 
TSST, participants reported what emotions, cognitive appraisals, and somatic sensations they experienced 
during the stressor. Bivariate correlations revealed that, in particular, body trust beliefs (how much 
individuals trusted their bodily signals) were negatively associated with alexithymia. Using hierarchical 
regression analyses, I also found that body trust beliefs predicted less intense negative, high arousal 
emotions from the TSST. There was also a significant interaction between body trust beliefs and 
alexithymia, such that greater difficulty identifying emotions exacerbated effects of poor or negative body 
trust beliefs on negative, high arousal emotions. Finally, in mediation models, I found that body trust 
beliefs effects on subjective stress were significantly mediated via difficulty identifying emotions. 
Altogether, these findings reveal that trusting one’s bodily signals and being able to identify and 
distinguish one’s emotional states are both related and important facets in predicting and perhaps 
exacerbating vs. mitigating acute stress experiences.   
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It takes little effort to recall a time when we felt stressed, and most of us can easily rattle off a list of our 
own individual stressors. Numerous products, from aromatherapy to weighted blankets, are sold every 
day with the promise of combating stress. However, growing scientific evidence also demonstrates that 
prolonged stressors can negatively shape downstream diseases and mental well-being. For example, stress 
exposure increases the risk for several chronic physical and mental health problems, such as rheumatoid 
arthritis (Cutolo & Straub, 2006), depression (Kendler, Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999; Monroe et al., 
2007), cardiovascular disease (Kivimäki et al., 2006), and chronic pain (Loeser & Melzack, 1999), as well 
as accelerated biological aging and premature mortality (Epel et al., 2004; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & 
Layton, 2010).  
Although stress is a familiar and likely personal concept for most people, defining the precise 
nature and mechanisms of “stress” continues to pose significant scientific challenges (Epel et al., 2018). 
Stress researchers have long sought to characterize the types of situations that tend to evoke stressful 
experiences, including situations where there are high demands on the individual and a certain amount of 
unpredictability or uncontrollability (Koolhaas et al., 2011; Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, 2012). Similarly, 
long-standing work in psychology emphasizes the role of appraisals, rumination, and coping behaviors in 
determining how intense and prolonged the emotional experience of “stress” is (Jamieson et al., 2012, 
2018; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). However, this literature on stress appraisals largely focuses on how 
individuals make meaning of their ability to cope with situational demands.  
More recently, work from affective science, psychophysiology, and neuroscience have 
emphasized individual differences in how people make meaning of their visceral signals and related 
affective states (Barrett, 2017, 2018; Lindquist, 2013; Oosterwijk et al., 2012). Researchers propose that 
people’s beliefs about their internal bodily sensations—that is, their interoceptive beliefs—are one 
mechanism that can alter how intense a given affective experience is, including feeling stressed (Chua & 
Bliss-Moreau, 2016; MacCormack, 2020; Mehling et al., 2012). For example, some work already shows 
that individuals high in anxiety sensitivity tend to find their interoceptive sensations, such as their 
heartbeat, more distressing, even though they do not generally differ from non-sensitive populations in 
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their heart rate reactivity (Stewart, Buffett-Jerrott, & Kokaram, 2001; Yoris et al., 2015; Zoellner & 
Craske, 1999).  
In addition to interoceptive beliefs, which could alter how individuals react to and manage their 
physiology during a stressor, other work from affective science suggests that the richness of people’s 
concept knowledge about emotions may be another important factor in shaping both the stress experience 
and coping behaviors. Alexithymia, a subclinical disorder characterized by difficulty identifying and 
interpreting one’s emotions, represents a deficit in emotion concept knowledge (Lindquist & Barrett, 
2008). Indeed, studies have long known that alexithymia can intensify distress during a stressor and can 
also increase the likelihood of developing stress-related disorders (Martin & Pihl, 1985, 1986a, 1986b; 
Martin et al., 1986).  
However, no work to date has looked at how interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia could work 
hand in hand to exacerbate individuals’ distress in the face of stress. Specifically, this thesis explores the 
role of alexithymia in moderating and/or mediating the association of interoceptive beliefs on both 
subjective stress (i.e., negative, high arousal emotions) and physiological stress (i.e., cardiovascular 
reactivity) during an acute stressor.  
Knowing your body: The role of interoceptive beliefs in stress 
Interoception refers to the process by which the central and peripheral nervous systems represent 
on-going bodily signals, and how one interprets these signals, both consciously and unconsciously (Craig, 
2003; Critchley et al., 2004). Interoception consists two key constructs, interoceptive sensitivity (or ability) 
and interoceptive beliefs. Interoceptive sensitivity refers to the accuracy with which one perceives their 
bodily signals, such as changes in one’s heart rate. These sorts of measures rely on techniques like signal 
detection theory to determine how well individuals are able to objectively detect changes in their heartbeat 
(Kleckner et al., 2017). On the one hand, interoceptive sensitivity represents people’s behavioral ability to 
consciously track visceral signals like heartbeat. Interoceptive beliefs, on the other hand, refer to people’s 
meta-cognitive self-construals and evaluative beliefs about their visceral signals. For example, people may 
believe they are highly accurate in detecting their internal signals, but in measures of interoceptive 
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sensitivity, they might still score very low, such that they are not that accurate in perceiving their bodily 
signals (Garfinkel et al., 2014).  
Ultimately, interoceptive beliefs may be especially important for people’s emotional and stress 
experiences, in part because these beliefs might shape how people try to cope or manage their physiology 
and other reactions to the situation. There are also strong theoretical justifications for why interoceptive 
beliefs (as well as impoverished emotion concept knowledge or alexithymia) should matter for people’s 
emotions. Specifically, the theory of constructed emotion proposes that all mental states, including 
emotions, are psychological events that are constructed ad hoc from the brain’s predictions, including 
afferent, interoceptive information from the periphery, incoming sensory information from the environment 
or current situation, and critically, accumulated concept knowledge and beliefs about emotions and the body 
(Barrett, 2017; Lindquist, MacCormack, & Shablack, 2015. Therefore, interoceptive beliefs are likely 
another important “ingredient” in the construction of people’s subjective emotion experiences, including 
during a stressor. These beliefs likely help inform one’s appraisal of a given affective experience is, 
including stress intensity (MacCormack, 2020).  
Interoceptive beliefs have been previously assessed across two domains: (1) how much people think 
that they notice and pay attention to their interoceptive sensations—known as body attention beliefs, and 
(2) how much people believe that interoceptive sensations are beneficial and trustworthy, versus difficult 
and misleading—known as body trust beliefs. These two different types of beliefs are typically measured 
through self-report questionnaires such as the Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness 
Questionnaire (MAIA; Mehling et al., 2012), and the Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ; Shields, 
Mallory, & Simon, 1989). The MAIA includes items that assess both attention and trust beliefs, whereas 
the BAQ only includes items that assess body attention beliefs.  
To date, although prior work has explored the role of other interoceptive processes in stress 
(Schultchen et al., 2019; Schulz & Vögele, 2015), only a little work has begun to explore the mechanisms 
by which interoceptive beliefs about attention and trust relate to stress. For example, individuals who report 
low resilience in the face of chronic stressors also report lower attention beliefs on the BAQ, and show 
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more exaggerated insular and thalamic activation during an acute stressor (Haase et al., 2016). Another 
recent study shows that individuals with higher MAIA reports have higher trait anxiety (Palser et al., 2018), 
but this study confounded attention and trust beliefs, so it is unclear whether one or both types of beliefs 
are related to trait anxiety. Altogether, although researchers have begun to explore the nature of 
interoceptive beliefs about bodily attention and trust, there is still very little work that has tested what role 
these beliefs may have for the stress experience. This thesis will address this gap in the literature by first 
disentangling the relations of attention and trust beliefs with self-reported emotions and cardiovascular 
reactivity during an acute stressor.  
The role of alexithymia in stress 
Although poor interoceptive beliefs may exacerbate the stress experience, psychological theories 
of emotion suggest that they may not be enough on their own to drive up stress reactivity. The theory of 
constructed emotion, for example, specifically argues that people’s conceptual knowledge about emotions 
is a critical ingredient for transforming interoceptive processes into specific emotional experiences 
(Barrett, 2017, 2018; Hoemann & Barrett, 2018; Lindquist, 2013; Lindquist, MacCormack, & Shablack, 
2015). However, when individuals have impoverished conceptual knowledge, this may have negative 
impacts on how individuals make meaning of and experience emotions (e.g., see discussion in Lindquist 
& Barrett, 2008). Alexithymia is a subclinical phenomenon characterized by difficulty in understanding 
and expressing one’s emotions and thus represents one way in which individuals may exhibit poor 
understanding or knowledge of emotion. A long history of research has identified three primary facets of 
alexithymia: difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty describing feelings, and externally-oriented thinking 
(Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). Difficulty identifying feelings represents confusion surrounding what 
specific emotion(s) a person is experiencing, and similarly, difficulty describing feelings represents an 
inability to find the specific labels and words for those emotions. Externally-oriented thinking represents 
a cognitive style that focuses on the external details of life; paying little attention to emotions and internal 
bodily states. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale [TAS-20] (Bagby et al., 1994) is one of the most commonly 
used instruments to measure alexithymia.  
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Alexithymia is often comorbid with other affect-based psychopathologies (Zamariola et al., 
2018), and alexithymic individuals are much more likely to under-report experiencing emotions, over-
report experiencing somatic sensations (known as somatization), score lower on scales of emotional 
intelligence, and be at a higher risk for substance abuse issues (Bailey & Henry, 2007; Mattila et al., 
2008; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2001; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1991). In the context of stress, 
individuals with alexithymic tendencies tend to report higher subjective arousal during a stressor and 
greater difficulty regulating their emotions in the face of stress (Connelly & Denney, 2007; Friedlander et 
al., 1997). Interestingly, individuals with alexithymia tend to develop somatic disorders, including 
hypochondriasis, wherein individuals are more likely to emphasize the physiological or arousal aspects of 
their affective feelings and report more physical maladies when distressed (Komaki, 2013; Palser et al., 
2018). During acute stressors, this heightened focus on bodily sensations manifests as an overestimation 
of one’s psychophysiological reactivity. For example, in one study of 100 college students during a stress 
induction, those who scored higher on the TAS-20 reported high subjective stress but displayed less heart 
rate reactivity compared to less alexithymic participants (Koci et al., 2016). This heightened, but 
inaccurate, reporting of physiological symptoms in the context of stress may however be driven in part by 
difficulties in interoception or internal bodily awareness and how individuals make meaning of their 
physiological sensations as either emotions (e.g., feeling stressed, anxious, angry) or somatic symptoms 
(e.g., headache, difficulty breathing).  
Given alexithymia’s connection to somatization tendencies, a growing body of work has sought 
to clarify how interoceptive processes relate to alexithymia. For example, alexithymia is linked with 
impoverished interoceptive beliefs, whereby TAS-20 scores are negatively correlated with BAQ and 
MAIA ratings (Zamariola et al., 2018). Additional studies have also found that alexithymic individuals 
show blunted heart rate perception on the heartbeat counting task - another measure that is thought to be 
related to interoceptive beliefs (Näring & van der Staak, 1995; Herbert, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2011). 
Although by and large, most data suggest that interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia have an inverse 
relationship, findings are mixed. For example, one study found that greater MAIA ratings were positively 
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associated with greater trait anxiety, and that this relationship was partially mediated by greater 
alexithymia (Palser et al., 2018). As such, alexithymia appears to be an important mediator whereby 
interoceptive beliefs—whether negative or positive—can impact anxiety and distress. Although it remains 
unclear whether attention or trust beliefs matter more for alexithymia and the stress response and in what 
direction, altogether these findings suggest that what individuals believe about their interoceptive 
sensations may indeed play a role in  how difficult or easy it is for individuals to distinguish between and 
make meaning more broadly of their affective states as emotions. As such, this thesis examines how 
attention and/or trust beliefs relate to the three different facets of alexithymia and also how attention and 
trust beliefs may interact with and even be mediated by alexithymia in the context of people’s emotions 
and cardiovascular changes during acute stress.   
The Present Study 
Altogether, previous literature suggests that alexithymia may in part by explained by 
interoceptive difficulties which, in turn, leads individuals with alexithymia to not clearly identify or 
distinguish between their emotions. However, it still remains unclear exactly how interoceptive beliefs 
and alexithymia might work on their own or together in explaining the emotional and cardiovascular 
dimensions of the acute stress response. This thesis examines how alexithymia may moderate and/or 
mediate the effects of interoceptive beliefs (attention and trust) on the stress response, which I have 
primarily operationalized as negative, high arousal emotion self-reports and cardiovascular reactivity. I 
also examine self-reported negative appraisals and somatic sensations as secondary measures of the acute 
stress response. In an initial session, participants completed questionnaires assessing interoceptive beliefs 
and alexithymia. In a follow-up session, participants completed an acute stress paradigm (the Trier Social 
Stress Task or TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). We collected continuous measures of 
cardiovascular reactivity before, during, and after the TSST. Immediately after the stressor, participants 
also reported on their subjective stress experience.  
In this senior honors thesis, I tested moderation versus mediation models in which interoceptive 
beliefs interact with alexithymia to potentially exacerbate the stress experience, as well as examining how 
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alexithymia mediates the effect of maladaptive body beliefs on stress. I hypothesized that greater body 
attention and body trust beliefs will be negatively associated with greater stress responses 
(operationalized as self-reported negative, high arousal emotion, self-reported somatic intensity, self-
reported negative stress appraisals, and cardiovascular reactivity).  I also hypothesized that greater 
alexithymia would be positively associated with greater stress responses. Specifically, I predicted that 
greater alexithymia would weaken the relationship between high interoceptive beliefs and stress, such that 
the presence of alexithymia might undermine the protective relationship that trusting and paying attention 
to one’s body may have against stress. Similarly, because interoceptive beliefs were measured on a single 
scale with high/low ratings, this hypothesis can be reversed, such that greater alexithymia would 
exacerbate the relation between low interoceptive beliefs and stress. Although correlational, this research 
provides valuable insight into how interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia may work together to relate to 
the in vivo psychological and physiological dimensions of the acute stress experience. 
Method 
Participants  
We collected data from 250 undergraduate students (57% female) at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill who were enrolled in PSYC101 at the time of their participation. As 
compensation for their participation, students received course credit. Participants ranged from 17 to 29 
years old, with an average of 19 years of age. See Table 1 for sample characteristics.  
Participants signed up for both Sessions 1 and 2 via the department’s online Sona Participant 
Pool. Participants were excluded from the study if they were not native English speakers, as one’s 
understanding and completion of tasks in the study was dependent upon fluency in the language, and 
because language itself is related to different ways of categorizing and organizing emotion concepts 
(Lindquist, 2017). Participants were also excluded if their BMI was greater than 33, or if they had a heart 
condition or pacemaker, as all of these factors can impede psychophysiology measurements. Participants 
were excluded if they had mental health disorders, including but not limited to bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorders, or an intense fear of public speaking. 
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These participants were excluded because of the use of the TSST during Session 2 of the study, because it 
induces negative, high arousal mood and we did not wish to put any vulnerable populations at risk,. 
Additionally, this helped us control for atypical emotional, physiological, or interoceptive processes that 
participants with psychopathology may experience.  
Participants were excluded (and rescheduled) on the day of the study if they had participated in 
behaviors that would compromise psychophysiological measurements. These behaviors include 
consuming a large meal less than one-hour prior to their lab session, or consuming caffeine, highly 
surgery drinks (like juice), or alcohol less than 3 hours prior to the lab visit. Other behaviors that elicit 
exclusion were engaging in physical exercise enough to sweat within one-hour of their session, and 
habitual use of nicotine or illicit substances within two weeks of their session. 
Design and Procedure 
This study was a quasi-experimental and correlational, investigating how interoceptive beliefs 
and alexithymia relate to and interact together in the context of an acute stressor to predict subjective 
measures of the stress experience (emotion reports, somatic reports, appraisals) and objective 
psychophysiological stress reactivity. The study consisted of two sessions, each lasting approximately 
two hours. Both sessions were conducted in Davie Hall 329. During Session 1, participants completed 
counterbalanced and randomized questionnaires in Qualtrics to assess their interoceptive beliefs and 
alexithymic tendencies.  In Session 2, cardiac physiological reactivity was measured before (5-min 
baseline), during the TSST (2-min speech preparation, 10-min speech, 5-min math task), and after the 
TSST (5-min recovery) using electrocardiography (ECG) and impedance cardiography (ICG). 
Session 1. Upon the participant’s arrival to the lab, the researcher directed the participant to a 
private testing room within the lab. Participants completed a “Daily Health Inventory” form, which 
allowed the researcher to confirm that the participant met the various physiological and health 
inclusionary criteria. Participants were excluded from the study if they failed to meet criteria that is 
unlikely to be quickly remediated, such as if the participant was a habitual smoker or drug user.  After 
confirming eligibility, participants completed informed consent and had an opportunity to ask questions. 
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After informed consent, participants completed several counterbalanced tasks (some not relevant to the 
present thesis), but of relevance to this thesis, completed self-report questionnaires on their interoceptive 
beliefs and alexithymia. At the end of the session, the researcher reminded and confirmed with 
participants their Session 2 signup.  
Session 2. Over 90% of participants returned for Session 2. Upon arrival, the researcher directed 
the participant into a larger private testing room with full psychophysiological equipment. As in Session 
1, participants completed a Session 2 Daily Health Inventory to confirm session eligibility. Afterwards, 
the researcher prepared the participant for the physiology data collection and collected a 5-min baseline 
measure of participants’ electrocardiography and impedance cardiography. After baseline data were 
collected, the researcher gave the participant a Session 2 Task Consent form (as specified by the IRB). 
After consent, the researcher introduced the participant to the Trier Social Stress Task and the two 
interviewers in front of whom they would be performing.  
The Trier Social Stress Task (TSST; Kirschbaum et al., 1993) is a gold-standard procedure 
inducing robust acute stress experiences. We administered the full version of the TSST wherein 
participants had 2-min to prepare a speech, 10-minute to perform the speech in front of two neutral 
evaluative interviewers, and 5-mni to perform a difficult mental arithmetic task again in front of the 
interviewers. Interviewers were white lab coats and professional clothing, maintained a neutral demeanor 
throughout their interactions with the participant, and took notes on a clipboard. Interviewers first 
provided participants with instructions regarding the content of the speech. Specifically, participants were 
instructed to imagine that they were giving an interview for a desirable job in their chosen field of 
interest, and to discuss their strengths, weakness, good and bad habits, and specific examples of their 
work ethic throughout the speech. After the 2-min preparation period alone, participants performed the 
10-minute speech in front of the two interviewers, who maintained neutral facial expressions and took 
notes throughout the TSST. Only if the participant ran out of things to say did the interviewers prompt the 
participant with questions. After the speech ended, the interviewers surprised participants with the math 
task. In this task, the participant was asked to count backwards from 996 in steps of 7 as quickly as 
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possible. If the task was too easy, interviewers provided a more difficult task (i.e., count backwards from 
2043 in steps of 17). If the math task was too hard (wherein the participant made six mistakes), 
interviewers provided a slightly easier task (i.e., count backwards from 943 in steps of 5). Regardless of 
the specific counting task assigned, all participant counted for a full five-minute duration.  
Once the TSST was complete, the interviewers left the room and the researcher administered the 
post-TSST Qualtrics measures of subjective stress. Recovery physiology measures were also collected for 
five minutes while the participant completed these questionnaires. Finally, after recovery and 
questionnaires were complete, the researcher removed all physiological sensors, debriefed the participant 
on the true aim of the study and awarded them four psychology credits for their participation.  
Session 1 Measures 
Interoceptive beliefs. In the present study, I was particularly interested in investigating two 
dimensions of interoceptive beliefs, body attention beliefs and body trust beliefs. To accomplish this, I 
collected data from three different self-report questionnaires that assessed one or both of these constructs.  
Body attention beliefs. I created a mean score (∝= .72) to represent people’s beliefs about how 
much they notice and pay attention to their interoceptive sensations using the Body Awareness 
Questionnaire (BAQ; Shields et al., 1989) and some subscales from the Multidimensional Assessment of 
Interoceptive Awareness; Mehling et al., 2012). The BAQ is an 18-item self-report measure of perceived 
awareness of bodily sensations (∝= .82). Responses for each item fall on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
(not at all true of me) to 7 (very true of me). Example items include, “I can distinguish between tiredness 
that's caused by hunger and tiredness that's caused by a lack of sleep” and “I know in advance when I'm 
getting the flu.” Similarly, the MAIA is a 32-item self-report measure of attentiveness and comfort with 
bodily sensations. I used the MAIA noticing, not distracting, and attention regulation subscales, as items 
encompass whether or not individuals report noticing, actively attending to, or ignoring interoceptive 
sensations. The noticing subscale consists of 4 items (∝= .56; e.g., “When I am tense, I notice where the 
tension is located in my body”). The not distracting subscale consists of 3 items (∝= .53; e.g., reverse 
item example: “I distract myself from sensations of discomfort.”). The attention regulation subscale 
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consists of 7 items (∝= .81; e.g., “I can maintain awareness of my inner bodily sensations even when 
there is a lot going on around me.”). Participants responded on 6-point Likert scale from 0 (never) to 5 
(always).  
Body trust beliefs. I created a mean score (∝= .86) to represent people’s beliefs about how much 
they trust, value, and listen to their interoceptive sensations by combining two MAIA subscales with the 
mean score of the Bodily Signals Beliefs Questionnaire (BSBQ; see MacCormack, 2020). Specifically, I 
used the MAIA body listening subscale (3 items, ∝= .74; “I listen to my body to inform me about what to 
do”), and body trusting subscale (3 items, ∝= .70; “I trust my body sensations”). The Bodily Signal 
Beliefs Questionnaire includes 7 items (∝= .77) which represent negative meta-cognitive beliefs about the 
value and management of interoceptive sensations, including items such as “My body is unpredictable,” 
“I have a hard time handling my bodily sensations,” “I believe that my body’s feelings can be 
misleading,” and “Sometimes I’m afraid of my bodily feelings.” BSBQ items were rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (extremely true of me). Here, I reverse coded each 
item so that higher endorsements suggest more positive or less negative trust beliefs. 
Alexithymia. Alexithymia is commonly measured with the well-validated Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). The TAS-20 is a 20-item instruments using a Likert 
scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) in which each item assesses one of the three subdomains of 
alexithymia: difficulty describing feelings (5 items, ∝= .78), difficulty identifying feelings (7 items, ∝= 
.79), and externally-oriented thinking (8 items, ∝= .59). I was most focused on the difficulty identifying 
feelings subscale, which includes 7 items (“I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling”; 
“When I'm upset, I don't know if I am sad, frightened, or angry.”). 
Session 2 Measures 
Psychophysiology. To assess stress-related changes in psychophysiology, we collected 
electrocardiography (ECG) and impedance cardiography (ICG) using Mindware Technologies (Gahanna, 
OH, USA) BioLab acquisition software. For ECG, three non-invasive spot electrodes were placed on 
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participants’ torso, with one electrode on the right collarbone (-) and two electrodes on the lowermost ribs 
(+ and ground). For ICG, two spot electrodes were placed at the top (+) and bottom (-) of the sternum and 
two more electrodes on the spine. ECG and ICG were continuously measured throughout a 5-min 
baseline, 2-min TSST prep period, 10-min TSST speech task, 5-min TSST math task, and 5-min post-
TSST recovery period as discussed above.  
ECG. Heart rate or HR is one of the most common measures of psychophysiological change. It is 
estimated as the number of beats per minute (bpm). HR reflects activity in both the sympathetic and 
parasympathetic nervous system and can only be used as a general measure of cardiovascular changes.   
ICG. Cardiac impedance quantifies the mechanical activation of the heart by measuring 
opposition to an alternating current flow within a circuit, specifically the thoracic cavity (Brownley, 
Hurwitz, & Schneiderman, 2000). In measures of cardiac impedance, a high frequency, low amplitude 
current is transmitted through the chest, and this current takes the path of least resistance through the 
aorta. Cardiac impedance thus measures the changes in this resistance. Pre-ejection period (PEP) is one 
of the gold-standard measures derived from impedance data. It is a measure of cardiac contractility, 
reflecting how long (in milliseconds) the time is between onset of cardiac depolarization to onset of the 
left ventricular contraction expelling blood from the left ventricle of the heart. Smaller PEP values 
suggest faster periods of cardiac contractility driven—in particular—by the sympathetic nervous system. 
Larger PEP values suggest slower periods of cardiac contractility, such as when individuals are more 
relaxed or at rest.  
Self-Reported Emotions. To measure emotional experience, participants rated their emotions 
using the 30-item Circumplex Positive & Negative Affect Scheduled (PANAS; Watson & Clark, 1994), 
and asked participants for their appraisals of the tasks in the TSST (such as difficulty and stressfulness) 
and their appraisals of the interviewers. Emotions were assessed in the PANAS across a variety of 
affective states ranging in valence (positive vs. negative) and arousal (high vs. low). In the Circumplex 
PANAS, participants rated how intensely they experienced each emotion on a Likert scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 6 (extremely). Items ranged across the four quadrants of valence (positive vs. negative) and arousal 
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(high vs. low). This thesis particularly focused on negative, high arousal emotions (∝= .89; 15 items 
total), which were most likely to be induced during the TSST.  
Negative Appraisals. The Negative Appraisal Questionnaire (∝= .94; see MacCormack, 2020) 
assessed 25 different negative descriptors aimed at capturing participants’ appraisals about themselves 
(e.g., defeated, failure, rejected) and the broader situation (e.g., unfair, uneventful). These items were 
selected to represent appraisals of personal responsibility and performance (internal attributions) vs. 
appraisals about the controllability and unexpectedness of the situation (external attributions). Items were 
rated on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 6 (extremely). 
Somatic Sensations. The Somatic Sensations Questionnaire was adapted and expanded from 
previous measures on somatic symptoms and autonomic sensations (e.g., Shields & Stern, 1979; Søgaard 
& Bech, 2009; Whitehead et al., 1977). It assesses 42 different somatic sensations (∝= .93) in which 
participants report on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 6 (“extremely”), the 
sensations they experienced during the TSST. These sensations included cardiac changes (e.g. “heart 
palpitations”), gastric changes (e.g. “pit in your stomach”), respiratory changes (e.g. “rapid or difficulty 
breathing”), and temperature changes (e.g. “flushed or hot’).  
Results 
Data preparation. Session 1 had 250 participants with 232 individuals returning for Session 2 
(92.8% retention rate). All variables of interest were distributed normally (see Table 1 for participant 
characteristics and Table 2 for descriptives), with some mild skew for the self-reported emotions and 
somatic sensations (i.e., people did not report extremely intense experiences). In terms of alexithymia 
distributions, 53.2% of our participants were not alexithymic (scores <50), 34% had borderline 
alexithymia scores (scores between 50-60), and 12.8% passed the clinical threshold for alexithymia 
(scores >60). I also visualized all data using scatterplots and histograms to identify potential outliers.  
Bivariate Correlations: Predictors 
As a first step in understanding the relationship between interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia, I 
conducted bivariate correlations between body attention beliefs, body trust beliefs, and each of the three 
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TAS-20 subscales for alexithymia (Table 3). When examining the relation between body attention and 
body trust beliefs, there was a significant positive association (r=.187, p=.003), such that people who 
report believing they notice and pay attention to their bodies more also tended to report that they trusted 
and listened to their bodies. When examining the intra-correlations between each of the three TAS-20 
subscales, all were significantly correlated with one another (ps<.01), as would be expected given that the 
TAS-20 is a well-validated and widely used scale for alexithymia.  
Finally, I examined the relation between body attention beliefs and alexithymia, and the relation 
between body trust beliefs and alexithymia. Notably, body attention beliefs were only related to the 
externalize subscale (r=-.249, p<.0001), but not with the identify (p=.144) or describe subscales (p=.901). 
Individuals who reported noticing and paying attention to their bodily sensations more were less likely to 
externalize their feelings and to focus on external stimuli rather than internal feelings and stimuli.  On the 
other hand, body trust beliefs were significantly and negatively associated with all facets of alexithymia: 
difficulty identifying emotions (r=-.420, p<.0001), difficulty describing emotions(r=-.252, p<.0001), and 
externally oriented thinking (r=-.175, p=.006). This indicates that individuals with greater body trust 
beliefs report lower alexithymia. 
Bivariate Correlations: Predictors with Demographics and TSST Outcomes 
After examining the relations among predictors, I ran bivariate correlations to identify significant 
associations between these predictors and demographics, specifically gender and BMI, as well as with our 
stress response outcomes from the Trier Social Stress Test – including reports of negative emotion, high 
arousal emotion, negative appraisals, somatic intensity, and measures of heart rate (HR) and pre-ejection 
period (PEP) reactivity (Table 4). Starting with the demographic variables of gender and BMI, there were 
no significant associations between body beliefs and alexithymia with either gender or BMI, suggesting 
that in general, these types of interoceptive beliefs and different facets of alexithymia are not more likely 
for one specific gender or distribution of healthy BMI. However, regarding the TSST outcomes, gender 
was significantly and negatively correlated with greater negative emotion (r= -.207, p=.002), high arousal 
emotion (r=-.142, p=.034), negative appraisals (r=-.230, p=.001), and somatic intensity (r=-.132, 
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p=.048), such that females endorsed experiencing these more during the TSST than males did. However, 
BMI was not significantly correlated with any of the TSST outcomes. 
Finally, I wanted to examine the bivariate association between my predictors of interest and the 
TSST outcomes. Body attention beliefs were only marginally significantly associated with PEP reactivity 
(r=-.117, p=.099) and had no other relations with additional outcomes. However, body trust beliefs were 
negatively associated with experiences of negative emotion (r=-.141, p=.035) and negative appraisals 
(r=-.140, p=.036), as well as a weaker, marginal association with high arousal emotion (r=-.113, 
p=.093). There was no association between body trust beliefs and reported somatic intensity.  
Turning to the three facts of alexithymia, greater difficulty identifying emotions was associated 
with higher reports of negative emotion (r=.219, p=.001), high arousal emotion (r=.206, p=.002), 
negative appraisals (r=.270, p<.000) and somatic intensity (r=.215, p=.001). Interestingly, individuals 
with greater difficulty identifying emotions also had lower HR reactivity (r=-.133, p=.049). This subscale 
was the most predictive of stress among the TAS-20 subscales: difficulty describing emotions was only 
significantly associated with greater negative appraisals (r=.183, p=.006) and individuals with greater 
externally-oriented thinking had marginally lower reports of high arousal emotion (r=-.117, p=.082) and 
somatic intensity (r=-.112, p=.096), but marginally higher PEP reactivity (r=.126, p=.075). 
Testing Moderation of Interoceptive Beliefs and Alexithymia 
I next conducted a priori determined hierarchical regression analyses to parse apart the unique 
effects of body attention, body trust, and alexithymia on TSST stress outcomes. Regression analyses with 
multiple predictors allowed me to examine how a given predictor may uniquely relate to an outcome of 
interest while controlling for shared variance with other variables. Furthermore, hierarchal regressions 
where groups of predictors are added at different steps of the analysis allowed me to see how the effect of 
a given predictor might change when accounting for shared variance with other predictors. Here, I wanted 
to examine how body attention and body trust beliefs each uniquely relate to TSST stress outcomes, how 
these beliefs may share variance with the three facets of alexithymia, and how interoceptive beliefs and 
alexithymia might interact together. Thus, I ran hierarchical regression models (see Tables 5-10), in 
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which body beliefs and alexithymia were included as predictors of stress outcomes during the TSST. In 
each model, we tested one of the six different stress outcomes. In the first step of each model, body 
beliefs were entered as predictors, then alexithymia subscales were included as the second step, gender 
and BMI as the third step, and interactions with body beliefs and the TAS identify subscale (the strongest 
alexithymic predictor) in the fourth and final step.  
Model 1: Hierarchical regression predicting negative affect (Table 5). Step 1 with body 
attention and body trust beliefs was marginally significant, F(2, 220) = 2.37, p = .096, adjusted R2=.012. 
Only body trust beliefs predicted negative affect (b=-.150, p=.047), but not body attention beliefs 
(p=.623).  
With the inclusion of alexithymia in the second model step, the overall model was significant, 
F(5, 217)= 2.95, p=.013, adjusted R2=.042. Difficulty identifying emotions significantly predicted 
negative affect (b=.24, p=.011), but body trust dropped from significance (p=.497). Difficulty describing 
emotions and externally-oriented thinking were not significant.  
The third model step, with the addition of gender and BMI, was also significant, F(7, 215)=3.42, 
p=.002, adjusted R2=.071. In this step, difficulty identifying emotions remained significant (p=.020) as 
was gender (b=-.44, p=.003).  
The fourth and final step included the interactions of body attention beliefs x difficulty identifying 
emotions and also body trust beliefs x difficulty identifying emotions. This final model was also 
significant, F(9, 213)=3.33, p=.001, adjusted R2=.086, such that altogether, body beliefs, alexithymia, 
gender, BMI, and the interactions explained around 8.6% of the variance in TSST negative affect. In this 
final model, difficulty identifying emotions and gender remained significant predictors (bs=.22, -.44, 
ps=.018, .003 respectively). Additionally, there was no interaction for body attention beliefs x difficulty 
identifying emotions (p=.614) but there was a significant interaction of body trust beliefs x difficulty 
identifying emotion on negative affect (b=-.15, p=.024).  
Probing this significant interaction revealed that the simple slopes were marginally significant at 
low levels of body trust beliefs (t=-1.81, p=0.071), with no difference in slopes at higher levels of body 
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trust (see Figure 1 for interaction plot). Altogether, these models suggest that although high body trust 
beliefs are associated with lower negative affective feelings during the acute stressor, difficulties 
identifying one’s feelings was the key driver or explainer for how negative people reported feeling. There 
was also an interactive effect, such that when body trust beliefs were low, individuals with greater 
difficulty identifying their emotions were the most likely to report more intense negative emotions from 
the acute stressor.  
Model 2:  Hierarchical regression predicting high arousal affect (Table 6). The first model 
step, containing body attention and trust beliefs, was not significant (p=.236). Only body trust beliefs 
marginally predicted high arousal affect (b=-.11, p=.090).  
The inclusion of alexithymia in the second model step was overall significant, F(5, 217)= 3.22, 
p=.008, adjusted R2=.048. In this step, difficulty identifying emotions significantly predicted greater high 
arousal affective feelings (b=.20, p=.011), while externally-oriented thinking predicted lower high 
arousal affective feelings (b=-.16, p=.018). Body trust beliefs were no longer significant after accounting 
for alexithymia (p=.560).  
The third model step, including gender and BMI, was also significant, F(7, 215)=2.79, p=.008, 
adjusted R2=.053. In this step, difficulty identifying emotions and externally-oriented thinking remained 
significant predictors (bs=.19, -.15, ps=.017, .032). Gender was marginally significant (b=-.23, p=.076).  
The fourth and final model step was also significant: F(9, 213)=2.52, p=.009, adjusted R2=.058, 
such that altogether body beliefs, alexithymia, gender, BMI, and the interactions explained around 5.8% 
of the variance in TSST-related high arousal affect. Difficulty identifying emotions and externally-
oriented thinking remained significant predictors (bs=.20, -.15, ps=.016, .028 respectively). As with 
negative affect, there was no interaction for body attention beliefs x difficulty identifying emotions 
(p=.687) but there was a marginal interaction of body trust beliefs x difficulty identifying emotion on high 
arousal affect (b=-.10, p=.075). Altogether, these models suggest that although high body trust beliefs 
may be weakly associated with lower high arousal affective feelings during the acute stressor, difficulties 
identifying one’s feelings and externalization tendencies were both primary drivers for how subjectively 
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arousing people reported feeling during the TSST. There was also some evidence for a possible 
interactive effect between body trust beliefs x difficulty identifying emotion on high arousal affect. 
Probing this interaction however found no significant differences in slopes.   
Model 3:  Hierarchical regression predicting negative appraisals (Table 7). The first model 
step, containing body attention and trust beliefs, was not overall significant (p=.109). However, greater 
body trust beliefs was associated with lower negative appraisals of the stressor (b=-.15, p=.036). The 
relation between body attention beliefs and negative appraisals was not significant (p=.811).  
The inclusion of alexithymia in the second model step was overall significant, F(5, 217)=3.87, 
p=.002, adjusted R2=.061. In this step, greater difficulty identifying emotions was significantly related to 
higher negative appraisals (b=.239, p=.005), but body trust beliefs were no longer significant (p=.657).  
The third model step, including gender and BMI, was also significant, F(7, 215)=4.65, p<.0001, 
adjusted R2=.103. In this step, difficulty identifying emotions remained significant (b=.22, p=.001) and 
gender emerged as another significant predictor (b=-.47, p=.001), such that females were more likely to 
make greater negative appraisals.  
The fourth and final model step was also significant: F(9, 213)=3.93, p<.0001, adjusted R2=.106, 
such that altogether body beliefs, alexithymia, gender, BMI, and the interactions explained around 10.6% 
of the variance in TSST-related negative appraisals. Difficulty identifying emotions and gender remained 
significant predictors even after accounting for interactive effects (bs=.22, -.47, ps=.01, .001 
respectively). However, no interactions with body beliefs were significant (ps=.604, .128).   
Model 4:  Hierarchical regression predicting somatic intensity (Table 8). The first model 
step, containing body attention and body trust beliefs, was not significant, (p=.416). Neither the relation 
between body trust beliefs and somatic intensity, nor the relation between body attention beliefs and 
somatic intensity were significant (ps=.257, .379 respectively).  
The inclusion of alexithymia in the second model step overall was significant, F(5, 217)= 3.088, 
p=.010, adjusted R2=.045. In this step, difficulty identifying emotions had a significant relation to somatic 
intensity (b=.179, p=.004), such that participants who struggled to identify their emotions more also 
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reported more intense somatic experiences, such as dizziness or headache following the TSST. 
Externally-oriented thinking was associated with lower somatic intensity (b=-.105, p=.044).   
The third step, including gender and BMI, was also significant, F(7, 215)= 2.585, p=.014, 
adjusted R2=.048. In this step, difficulty identifying emotions remained a significant predictor of somatic 
intensity (b=.171, p=.005), but externally-oriented thinking dropped to only marginal significance (b=-
.093, p=.077).  
The fourth and final step was also significant F(9, 213)=2.228, p= .021, adjusted R2 =.047, such 
that altogether body beliefs, alexithymia, gender, BMI, and the interactions explained around 4.7% of the 
variance in TSST-related somatic intensity. Difficulty identifying emotions remained a significant 
predictor (b=.167, p=.007), However, no interactions with body beliefs were significant (ps=.642, .179).   
Model 5:  Hierarchical regression predicting heart rate reactivity (Table 9). The first model 
step, containing body attention and body trust beliefs, was not overall significant (p=.592). Neither body 
trust beliefs nor body awareness beliefs significantly predicted heartrate reactivity (ps=.811, 307).  
The second model step, including alexithymia, was also not significant (p=.362). In this step, 
difficulty identifying emotions only marginally predicted HR reactivity (b=-1.097, p=.081), and there 
were no other significant predictors.   
The third model step, with gender and BMI, was still not significant (p=.483). In this step, 
difficulty identifying emotions remained marginally significant (b=-1.865, p=.081).  
In the fourth and final step, including body beliefs, alexithymia, gender and BMI, and 
interactions, was also not significant (p= .623). Difficulty identifying emotions also dropped from 
marginal significance (p=.115), and no interactions with  body beliefs were significant (ps=.450, .730).   
Model 6:  Hierarchical regression predicting pre-ejection reactivity (Table 10). The first 
model step, containing body attention and body trust beliefs, was not overall significant (p=.225). Body 
attention beliefs was marginally associated with lower PEP reactivity (b=-2.053, p=.085), but body trust 
beliefs was not a significant predictor.  
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The second model step, including alexithymia, was also not significant (p=.240), and body 
attention beliefs dropped from significance (p=.120).   
The third model step, with gender and BMI, was still not significant (p=.234). There were no 
significant predictors of PEP reactivity in this step.  
The fourth and final step, including body beliefs, alexithymia, gender and BMI, and interactions, 
was also not significant (p= .324). There were still no significant predictors, and no interactions with 
body beliefs were significant (ps=.899, .295).   
Testing Mediation of Interoceptive Beliefs and Alexithymia 
 Finally, given that the inclusion of alexithymia (specifically, difficulty identifying emotions) 
significantly reduced the explanatory power of body trust beliefs, we reasoned that difficulty identifying 
one’s emotions could act as a suppressor variable masking or helping mediate the effect of body trust 
beliefs on individuals’ stress responses. Thus, we conducted mediation modeling to examine whether 
difficulty identifying emotions mediates the effect of body trust beliefs on negative high arousal emotion, 
negative appraisals, somatic intensity, and heart rate reactivity (Figure 2). When examining the mediating 
effect of difficulty identifying emotions on negative, high arousal emotions, we found a significant 
negative direct effect of body trust on difficulty identifying emotions (a path: b=-.40, SE=.06, p<.0001) 
and a significant positive direct effect of difficulty identifying emotions on negative, high arousal emotion 
reports (b path: b=.24, SE=.09, p=.010), but no direct effect of body trust on negative, high arousal 
emotions (c path: b= -.06, SE=.09, p=.535). There was, however, a significant indirect (a*b) effect (b=-
.10, SE=.04, p=.017) and a marginal total effect (b=-.16, SE=.09, p=.073). This model suggests that 
difficulty identifying emotions fully mediates the effect of body trust on negative, high arousal emotion 
reports, such that individuals high in body trust beliefs are less likely to have greater difficulty identifying 
their feelings, ultimately translating to less intense negative, high arousal emotional experiences during 
the acute stressor. Similarly, we found that difficulty identifying emotions again significantly and fully 
mediated effects of body trust beliefs on negative appraisals and somatic intensity during the acute 
stressor, in the same directions (see Figure 2 for statistics).  
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Turning to the psychophysiology data, we only focused on heart rate stress reactivity (relative to 
the within-person baseline), given that there were no effects of alexithymia on pre-ejection period 
reactivity. As expected, there was a significant negative direct effect of body trust on difficulty identifying 
emotions (a path: b=-.41, SE=.06, p<.0001) and a significant negative direct effect of difficulty 
identifying emotions on heart rate reactivity (b path: b= -1.99, SE=.92, p=.030), with no direct effect of 
body trust on heart rate reactivity (c path: b= -.78, SE=.91, p=.391). There was also a significant indirect 
(a*b) effect (b=.83, SE=.40, p=.039) but no significant total effect (b=.05, SE=.84, p=.956). These 
mediation models suggest that individuals with lower body trust beliefs have higher difficulties 
identifying emotions which is then related to lower heart rate reactivity during the stressor.  
Altogether, these mediation models suggest that individuals with lower body trust beliefs exhibit 
higher stress responses across psychological measures (negative, high arousal emotions, negative 
appraisals, reported somatic intensity), but not physiological measures such as heart rate reactivity. 
However, greater difficulty identifying emotions appears to be an important mediator in whether 
impoverished body trust beliefs translate to more negative and reactive stress responses. For example, 
greater difficulty identifying one’s emotions was an important mediator in greater psychological stress 
responses, but may have weakened the mediated negative effects of low body trust beliefs on heart rate 
reactivity.  
Discussion 
In sum, I found that interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia can work hand in hand to potentially 
exacerbate or buffer against psychological and cardiovascular stress responses. Specifically, people with 
both low body trust beliefs and greater difficulty identifying emotions had the strongest and most negative 
self-reported stress experiences and appraisals relative to individuals with higher body trust beliefs or lower 
identification problems. Furthermore, in addition to these main effects, difficulty identifying emotions 
interacted with body trust beliefs, such that when body trust beliefs were low, individuals who had greater 
difficulty identifying their emotions were the most likely to report more intense negative emotions from the 
acute stressor. There was a parallel but weaker interactive effect for high arousal emotion. Difficulty 
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identifying emotions across the board mediated effects of low body trust beliefs on people’s psychological 
stress responses (e.g., reported negative and high arousal emotions, negative appraisals, somatic intensity).  
One possible interpretation is that not trusting one’s interoceptive signals and sensations could 
make it more difficult for individuals to differentiate or identify which specific emotions and feelings they 
are experiencing. In this way, trusting one’s body could make it easier to engage with bodily sensations, 
perhaps especially during conditions of potentially aversive arousal, and in turn value these sensations as 
sources of emotional insight. Findings from this study are cross-sectional, so it is also possible that the 
reverse pattern might be true, where people who have difficulty identifying their emotions are more likely 
to develop distrust of their bodily signals. Below, I discuss other specific findings that this study provides 
on the nature of interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia in acute stress experiences.  
In addition to these psychological stress effects, I found in both the bivariate correlations and 
mediation models that greater alexithymic tendencies (specifically, difficulties identifying one’s emotions) 
was related to lower heart rate reactivity, consistent with classic findings in the alexithymia stress literature 
(e.g., Linden, Lenz, & Stossel, 1996). This finding suggests that alexithymia likely exacerbates the 
psychological experience of stress despite alexithymic individuals exhibiting less physiological reactivity. 
Specifically, individuals with alexithymia may feel worse and more stressed even in the face of less 
physiological input than non-alexithymic individuals. Interoceptive beliefs, however, did not matter as 
much for physiological stress reactivity, at least when considering them as main effects or in interaction 
with alexithymia. There was however a significant mediation effect of lower body trust beliefs on heart rate 
reactivity via difficulty identifying emotions, indicating that interoceptive beliefs likely do matter for 
physiological dimensions of stress, but perhaps only via certain mediators like alexithymia. Below, I discuss 
findings further as well as point out important strengths, limitations, and future directions for this work.   
Interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia  
 First, this study capitalized on a large sample size to better capture and describe the relation between 
interoceptive beliefs and facets of alexithymia. Although previous studies report mixed, often contradictory, 
findings about how different facets of interoception can impact the intensity of stress responses, the present 
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study suggests that interoceptive beliefs may be protective against aversive stress experiences (especially 
psychological stress). Moreover, this protective relationship was primarily driven by body trust beliefs, 
more so than body attention beliefs. One possible reason for this is that body attention beliefs are 
fundamentally about how much you think you notice your bodily sensations—and although this sort of self-
characterization may be useful for self-judgments or motivated interoceptive attention, it is likely that this 
sort of belief may not relevant or useful in evocative situations like an acute stressor. On the other hand, 
body trust beliefs are rooted in people’s evaluative schemas about the utility versus harm of bodily 
sensations. These value-based beliefs may be much more relevant in shaping how people (either implicitly 
or consciously) react to and interpret their interoceptive signals. Future research should continue to parse 
apart the difference between these two constructs and study their shared and/or unique contributions to 
affective experience and stress. For example, research should test whether body attention beliefs are more 
relevant in situations in which people have the attentional affordances to consciously notice and reflect on 
their bodily sensations, whereas body trust beliefs could be more relevant for online affective and somatic 
experiences, or for situations with high cognitive load. 
Second, this study provides evidence for a clear link between alexithymia and self-reported stress, such 
that higher scores on the TAS-20 were positively associated with reports of more intense and negative stress 
responses on a number of different indices. Notably, difficulty identifying emotions appears to be the 
construct largely driving this association. Although previous research has investigated the alexithymia-
stress link, most of this work to date focuses on the role of alexithymia in predicting physiological reactivity 
during stress, on markers such as salivary cortisol or cardiovascular measures like heart rate and blood 
pressure. For example, Linden and colleagues (1996) found that heart rate (but not blood pressure) was less 
reactive during stress tasks in eight individuals with alexithymic tendencies. However, Papciak et al. (2010) 
found no differences in heart rate and blood pressure stress reactivity between fifteen alexithymic 
individuals compared to fifteen non-alexithymic individuals. Similarly, Friedlander et al. (1997) found no 
group differences in heart rate reactivity (with n=42 alexithymic vs. n=42 non-alexithymic individuals) but 
did find that alexithymic individuals showed greater electrodermal reactivity to the stressors; these findings 
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are in direct contradiction to Pollatos et al. (2011)’s findings that greater alexithymia (N=60) was associated 
with lower electrodermal reactivity.  
Notably, these studies all rely upon small sample sizes that are likely insufficient to reliably detect the 
small effect size of alexithymia in relation to stress outcomes. Also, most of these studies did not break 
down alexithymia into its subcomponents (although two studies did find effects specifically with difficulty 
describing feelings). Thus, it remains largely unclear exactly how alexithymia and its facets might interface 
with acute stressors. The present study demonstrates that difficulties with identifying one’s feelings 
mattered the most for heart rate reactivity during the stressor, and that alexithymic tendencies are related to 
lower heart rate reactivity, even though these individuals report more intense stress experiences and 
appraisals. 
Finally, when looking at the relation between interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia, body attention 
beliefs was negatively associated with externally-oriented thinking whereas body trust beliefs was negative 
associated with all three alexithymic subscales. The relation between body attention beliefs and externally-
oriented thinking suggest that people who don’t think they pay attention to their bodily sensations much are 
also more likely to report being more focused on external or situational factors in their lives, rather than 
internal, psychologically rich factors such as emotions. However, body trust beliefs had the clearest and 
strongest link with alexithymia overall. People who endorse greater distrust of their bodily signals are also 
more likely to report overall alexithymic difficulties. In the regression models, probing the interaction 
between body trust beliefs and difficulty identifying emotions further revealed a significant interaction, such 
that at low levels of body trust, participants with greater identification difficulties reported more negative 
emotion during the acute stressor than individuals low in that alexithymic facet. However, at high levels of 
body trust, the difference in negative emotion between low and high alexithymia in participants was not 
significant, demonstrating the importance of body trust beliefs for stress outcomes.   
It is important to note that interoceptive beliefs (both attention and trust) were only marginally related 
to measures of physiological reactivity during acute stress (e.g., in the bivariate correlations and regression 
models) and these effects disappeared when accounting for alexithymia. This suggests that alexithymia 
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(especially difficulty identifying emotions) may be a more proximal driver of physiological reactions during 
stress. However, it remains possible that other facets of interoception, such as interoceptive ability as 
measured by the Whitehead Heartbeat Detection task, may be more relevant or important for physiological 
reactivity to stress, while interoceptive beliefs may be more relevant for subjective measures of affective 
stress. This present study also includes data from the Whitehead Heartbeat Detection task, so a next analysis 
step will be for us to examine how both interoceptive beliefs and interoceptive ability may interact with or 
be mediated by alexithymia in predicting psychological and physiological stress responses.  
Finally, the mediation model best explained the relationship between body trust beliefs, difficulty 
identifying emotions, and stress as operationalized as negative, high arousal emotion, as well as negative 
appraisals, somatic intensity, and heart rate reactivity. The benefit of trusting one’s bodily sensations on 
acute stress was undermined when individuals had difficulty identifying their emotions. This finding 
suggests that clinical science could develop intervention strategies that target both body trust beliefs, as 
well as the identification and differentiation of one’s emotions, such as emotional granularity training, in 
order to improve mental health treatments for alexithymic populations. Emotional granularity is the ability 
to articulate emotional states with specificity and precision, and much like alexithymia, low negative 
emotional granularity has been associated with stronger reactivity to negative affect and higher vulnerability 
to poor mental health (Bamonti et al., 2010; Demiralp et al., 2012). 
Limitations 
Although the present study included a robust sample size and gold-standard measures, it is not 
without limitations. A chief limitation is that study findings are cross-sectional and correlational, limiting 
our ability to draw causal inferences between interoceptive beliefs and alexithymia. Although these 
findings suggest that interoceptive beliefs likely influence the experience of acute stress, further research 
must be done to validate this finding. In particular, it remains unclear whether low body trust beliefs lead 
to the downstream development of alexithymia (especially difficulty identifying one’s feelings) or 
whether the reverse causal path is true instead.  
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Additionally, to protect against confounds, we controlled for BMI and age, such that our sample 
included only healthy college-aged students, with BMIs under 33, and no history of psychiatric illness. 
Although these were important choices to ensure the quality of our data, one downside is that findings 
may not generalize to other populations such as older adults or individuals with anxiety disorders. 
Consequently, future research should give attention to longitudinal studies that examine the development 
of interoceptive beliefs alongside alexithymia in early life, and how these two might similarly or 
differently change across the lifespan, especially as participants experience significant changes in weight, 
shifts in everyday stress, and the emergence of psychopathology. 
Conclusion 
Acute stress is a part of daily life. Ultimately, a certain amount of physiological and subjective 
changes during challenging life events can be “good” in that stressful feelings are motivating (e.g., 
wanting to resolve the conflict or issue in order to feel less unpleasant) and physiological changes provide 
the body with resources to cope with situational demands (e.g., giving a speech, running away). However, 
when stress is unmoderated, such as in chronic life stress, or poorly managed acute stress, there are a 
multitude of detrimental downstream implications for mental and physical health. Consequently, research 
is needed to identify the factors that can mitigate, as well as exacerbate, stress responses. Two such 
factors are interoception and alexithymia. Although ongoing research is still focused on identifying the 
precise nature of the relation between interoception and stress, this thesis suggests that the interoceptive 
belief of body trust is protective against stress. Regarding alexithymia, many studies have identified that 
alexithymia is correlated with more aversive stress experiences, as well as with stress disorders, 
depression, and substance abuse. Body trust, and perhaps other interoceptive factors, may prove to be an 
invaluable path for treatment across psychopathologies, as well as for demographics disproportionately 
impacted by chronic life stress, such as members of minority groups and/or low socioeconomic status. 
Nevertheless, even in nonclinical populations, body trust could help ameliorate or protect against the 
detrimental effects of acute stress, ultimately helping individuals better cope with and remain resilient in 
the face of negative life experiences.   
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Table 1. Sample characteristics.  
Demographics Total 
Self-identified gender  
     N Female  144 (57.6%) 
     N Male  106 (42.4%) 
Self-identified ethnicity  
     N African descent  34 (13.6%) 
     N Asian descent  34 (13.6%) 
     N European descent  144 (57.6%) 
     N Latinx descent 16 (6.4%) 
     N Bi- or multi-racial  15 (6.0%) 
     N Other  7 (2.8%) 
Other demographics  
     Mean Age  19.20 ± 1.29 
     Mean BMI (self-report) 22.76 ± 2.86 
Somatization a  
     Mean Symptom reports   1.49 ± .39 
     Mean Hypochondriasis 1.53 ± .67 
Alexithymia b  
     N Non-Alexithymic 133 (53.2%) 
     N Borderline Alexithymic 85 (34.0%) 
     N Alexithymic 32 (12.8%) 
a Somatization tendencies were assessed using the Common Mental Disorders somatization and hypochondriasis 
subscales (Sogaard & Bech, 2009). b Alexithymia or difficulty identifying and expressing one’s feelings was 
assessed using the 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1993) included for a secondary 
question not addressed in this dissertation. Note that I did not assess for depressive or anxious tendencies, given that 
these were conditions that we screened out during intake.  
 
Table 2. Descriptives for primary variables.  
Variable Mean S.D. Min-Max 
Body beliefs    
     Body attention  3.76 .72 1.71-6.21 
     Body trust  4.51 .74 2.22-6.39 
Alexithymia    
     TAS Overall 2.47 .47 1.40-3.90 
     TAS Identify  2.31 .63 1.00-4.29 
     TAS Describe  2.87 .85 1.00-5.00 
     TAS Externalize  2.37 .49 1.25-3.75 
Stress outcomes    
     Negative emotion  1.78 .11 0.00-5.31 
     High arousal emotion 1.86 .95 0.18-4.59 
     Neg hi emotion 2.09 1.31 0.00-5.44 
     Negative appraisals 1.37 1.03 0.00-5.75 
     Somatic intensity .98 .73 0.00-3.73 
     HR reactivity 17.63 12.56 -10.77-77.54 
     PEP reactivity -10.77 11.51 -53.55-24.67 
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Table 3. Within- and between-predictor bivariate correlations.  
 
 Body Beliefs Alexithymia 
Variables Attn Trust Identify Describe External Overall 
Body Beliefs 
     Attention - .187** .093 -.008 -.249***     -.064 
     Trust  - -.420*** -.252*** -.175** -.383*** 
Alexithymia 
     Identify   - .537*** .158* .776*** 
     Describe    - .316*** .832*** 
     Externalize      - .631*** 
     Overall      - 
Note: *** p< .001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 4. Bivariate correlations between predictors and TSST outcomes.  
 
 Demographics TSST Outcomes 












Body beliefs         
1. Attention .078 .057 -.058 -.004 -.010 .046 -.068 -.117† 
2. Trust .007 -.033 -.141* -.113† -.140* -.067 .004  .009 
Alexithymia         
3. Identify .027 -.028 .219** .206** .270** .215** -.133* .057 
4. Describe .013 .026 .109 .084 .183** .076 -.065 .086 
5. Externalize .066 .103 -.032 -.117† -.006 -.112† .047 .126† 
Demographics         
6. BMI - .080 -.001 .016 .021 -.006 -.070 .055 
7. Gender  - -.207** -.142* -.230** -.132* .031 -.085 
TSST outcomes         
8. Neg emotion   - .914** .799** .748** .091 -.035 
9. Hi emotion    - .749** .781** .095 -.116 
10. Neg appraisals     - .725** .082 -.045 
11. Somatic intensity      - .133† -.077 
12. HR reactivity       - -.371** 
13. PEP reactivity        - 
Note: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 5. Model 1: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported negative affect during the 
Trier Social Stress Task, with main effects and interactions for body beliefs and alexithymia.  
 
Predictor variables R2 b SE (b)  p 
Step 1 .012†     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.037 .076 -.033 .623 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.150* .075 -.135 .047 
Step 2 .042*     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.104 .078 -.093 .185 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.056 .082 -.051 .497 
    TAS Identify  .237* .093 .214 .011 
    TAS Describe  .014 .090 .012 .880 
    TAS Externalize  -.104 .079 -.093 .187 
Step 3    .071**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.090 .078 -.080 .249 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.067 .081 -.061 .409 
    TAS Identify  .215* .092 .194 .020 
    TAS Describe  .024 .089 .021 .786 
    TAS Externalize  -.073 .078 -.065 .355 
    BMI  .020 .072 .018 .785 
    Gender  -.437** .148 -.195 .003 
Step 4    .086**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.097 .077 -.086 .213 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.023 .083 -.021 .783 
    TAS Identify  .219* .092 .198 .018 
    TAS Describe  .014 .089 .012 .875 
    TAS Externalize  -.079 .078 -.071 .309 
    BMI  .028 .072 .026 .694 
    Gender  -.438** .147 -.195 .003 
    Body Attention x Identify  -.040 .079 -.034 .614 
    Body Trust x Identify  -.150* .066 -.152 .024 
Note: All main effects are z-scored.  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 6. Model 2: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported high arousal affect during 
the Trier Social Stress Task, with main effects and interactions for body beliefs and alexithymia.  
 
Predictor variables R2 b SE (b)  p 
Step 1 .004        
    Body Attention Beliefs  .017 .065 .017 .800 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.110† .064 -.116 .090 
Step 2 .048**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.054 .067 -.057 .416 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.041 .070 -.043 .560 
    TAS Identify  .202* .079 .213 .011 
    TAS Describe  .007 .077 .008 .924 
    TAS Externalize  -.160* .067 -.167 .018 
Step 3    .053**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.049 .067 -.051 .467 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.047 .070 -.050 .501 
    TAS Identify  .189* .079 .200 .017 
    TAS Describe  .013 .077 .013 .864 
    TAS Externalize  -.146* .068 -.152 .032 
    BMI  .030 .062 .032 .629 
    Gender  -.227† .127 -.119 .076 
Step 4    .058**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.054 .067 -.056 .426 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.019 .072 -.020 .797 
    TAS Identify  .192* .080 .203 .016 
    TAS Describe  .007 .077 .007 .930 
    TAS Externalize  -.150* .068 -.157 .028 
    BMI  .036 .063 .038 .567 
    Gender  -.229† .128 -.119 .075 
    Body Attention x Identify  -.028 .069 -.027 .687 
    Body Trust x Identify  -.096† .057 -.114 .096 
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Table 7. Model 3: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported negative appraisals during 
the Trier Social Stress Task, with main effects and interactions for body beliefs and alexithymia.  
 
Predictor variables R2 B SE (b)  p 
Step 1 .011     
    Body Attention Beliefs  .017 .070 .016 .811 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.147* .070 -.143 .036 
Step 2 .061**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.049 .072 -.047 .494 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.034 .076 -.033 .657 
    TAS Identify  .239** .085 .233 .005 
    TAS Describe  .078 .083 .073 .348 
    TAS Externalize  -.075 .072 -.072 .300 
Step 3    .103**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.035 .071 -.034 .621 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.046 .074 -.045 .535 
    TAS Identify  .215* .083 .209 .011 
    TAS Describe  .090 .081 .084 .271 
    TAS Externalize  -.043 .071 -.041 .551 
    BMI  .034 .065 .034 .601 
    Gender  -.469** .134 -.226 .001 
Step 4    .106**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.041 .071 -.039 .566 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.017 .076 -.016 .825 
    TAS Identify  .219** .084 .214 .010 
    TAS Describe  .084 .081 .079 .302 
    TAS Externalize  -.046 .071 -.045 .516 
    BMI  .041 .066 .040 .533 
    Gender  -.472** .135 -.227 .001 
    Body Attention x Identify  -.038 .073 -.034 .604 
    Body Trust x Identify  -.092 .060 -.101 .128 
Note: All main effects are z-scored.  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 8. Model 4: Hierarchical regression model predicting self-reported somatic intensity during the 
Trier Social Stress Task, with main effects and interactions for body beliefs and alexithymia.  
 
Predictor variables R2 B SE (b)  p 
Step 1 -.001     
    Body Attention Beliefs  .044 .050 .060 .379 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.057 .050 -.078 .257 
Step 2 .045**     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.010 .051 -.013 .848 
    Body Trust Beliefs  .006 .054 .008 .916 
    TAS Identify  .179** .061 .246 .004 
    TAS Describe  -.011 .059 -.014 .857 
    TAS Externalize  -.105* .052 -.142 .044 
Step 3    .048*     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.004 .052 -.006 .937 
    Body Trust Beliefs  .002 .054 .002 .975 
    TAS Identify  .171** .061 .235 .005 
    TAS Describe  -.007 .059 -.009 .907 
    TAS Externalize  -.093† .052 -.126 .077 
    BMI  .002 .048 .002 .972 
    Gender  -.159 .098 -.108 .108 
Step 4    .047*     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.002 .052 -.003 .962 
    Body Trust Beliefs  .014 .056 .019 .802 
    TAS Identify  .167** .062 .228 .007 
    TAS Describe  -.014 .060 -.019 .810 
    TAS Externalize  -.097† .052 -.131 .067 
    BMI  .000 .048 .002 .998 
    Gender  -.152 .099 -.103 .125 
    Body Attention x Identify  .025 .053 .032 .642 
    Body Trust x Identify  -.060 .044 -.092 .179 
Note: All main effects are z-scored.  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 9. Model 5: Hierarchical regression model predicting heart rate reactivity from the Trier Social 
Stress Task relative to a neutral baseline, with main effects and interactions for body beliefs and 
alexithymia.  
 
Predictor variables R2 b SE (b)  p 
Step 1 .005     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.899 .878 -.071 .307 
    Body Trust Beliefs  .205 .857 .017 .811 
Step 2 .025     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.390 .918 -.031 .671 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.589 .957 -.048 .539 
    TAS Identify  -1.907† 1.086 -.154 .081 
    TAS Describe  -.082 1.067 -.006 .939 
    TAS Externalize  .671 .925 .053 .469 
Step 3    .030     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.309 .927 -.024 .739 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.572 .960 -.046 .552 
    TAS Identify  -1.865† 1.093 -.150 .089 
    TAS Describe  -.091 1.069 -.007 .932 
    TAS Externalize  .724 .937 .057 .440 
    BMI  -.845 .855 -.068 .324 
    Gender  .609 1.743 .024 .727 
Step 4    .033     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -.366 .934 -.029 .696 
    Body Trust Beliefs  -.546 .991 -.044 .582 
    TAS Identify  -1.750 1.107 -.141 .115 
    TAS Describe  -.011 1.078 -.001 .992 
    TAS Externalize  .752 .941 .059 .425 
    BMI  -.772 .885 -.062 .373 
    Gender  .504 1.754 .020 .774 
    Body Attention x Identify  -.725 .957 -.054 .450 
    Body Trust x Identify  .267 .772 .024 .730 
Note: All main effects are z-scored.  ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10  
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Table 10. Model 6: Hierarchical regression model predicting pre-ejection period reactivity from the 
Trier Social Stress Task relative to a neutral baseline, with main effects and interactions for body 
beliefs and alexithymia.  
 
Predictor variables R2 b SE (b)  p 
Step 1 .015     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -2.053† 1.187 -.125 .085 
    Body Trust Beliefs  .566 1.096 .037 .606 
Step 2 .034     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -1.936 1.241 -.118 .120 
    Body Trust Beliefs  1.303 1.215 .086 .285 
    TAS Identify  1.071 1.637 .059 .514 
    TAS Describe  .782 1.195 .055 .514 
    TAS Externalize  2.031 1.738 .088 .244 
Step 3    .047     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -1.940 1.250 -.119 .122 
    Body Trust Beliefs  1.243 1.214 .082 .307 
    TAS Identify  .885 1.639 .048 .590 
    TAS Describe  .788 1.194 .056 .510 
    TAS Externalize  2.260 1.767 .098 .203 
    BMI  .248 .283 .063 .382 
    Gender  -2.316 1.668 -.100 .167 
Step 4    .052     
    Body Attention Beliefs  -1.918 1.264 -.117 .131 
    Body Trust Beliefs  1.464 1.245 .097 .241 
    TAS Identify  .880 1.647 .048 .594 
    TAS Describe  .729 1.200 .052 .545 
    TAS Externalize  2.221 1.774 .097 .212 
    BMI  .248 .287 .063 .389 
    Gender  -2.314 1.679 -.099 .170 
    Body Attention x Identify  .118 .930 .009 .899 
    Body Trust x Identify  -.789 .752 -.077 .295 
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Note: I also tested the reverse pattern, in which people who have difficulty identifying their 
emotions are more likely to develop distrust of their bodily signals. While difficulty identifying 
emotions did negatively predict body trust beliefs, there was no direct of body trust beliefs on any 
of the outcomes, nor was there a significant indirect effect of difficulty identifying emotions via 
body trust on the outcomes. This supports the interpretation that body trust belief effects are 
mediated via difficulty identifying emotions in the context of stress, but not vice versa.  
 
 
